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BANKS AGAINST SECURED PARTIES TO THE
VICTOR GO THE SPOILS
Janet A. Flaccus*
INTRODUCTION
Priority fights among creditors are a common part of a failed business. In
the past, priority fights were largely ignored by the statutes of the day. This
changed with the drafting of Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code
("U.C.C."). As Grant Gilmore, a principal draftsman of Article Nine said:
[m]ost of the pre-Code security statutes ignored priority problems,
leaving them to be solved, as they arose, by the courts on whatever
principles occurred to the judges. The statutory tradition of sweeping
all priority problems under the rug no doubt, stems from the
nineteenth-century chattel mortgage acts, which were, designedly,
fragmentary affairs.'
In contrast, Article Nine was designed to tackle priority problems head on.
Yet, despite the draftsmen's industrious attempt to address all priority
problems, the priority battle between banks claiming an interest not created
under Article Nine and secured parties has split the courts. The priority fight
between a bank, as a secured party, and another secured party is not at issue
here because it is squarely handled by Article Nine. The focus of this paper
is the priority dispute between a bank with secured lines of credit and a
secured party with proceeds which pass through the bank.
There are several ways a bank can pay off a loan other than by enforcing
an Article Nine security interest or a mortgage. First, a bank can set-off a loan
obligation with an account a debtor maintains with the bank. Second, the bank
may set up a blocked account whereby accounts receivable are paid into a
blocked account which is solely in the bank's control. Last, a debtor might
authorize the withdrawl of money from one of his accounts, or pay the bank
by check or wire transfer. If the money taken by the bank constitutes the
proceeds of an Article Nine secured party, there is a priority fight. The extent
* Professor of Law, University of Arkansas.
GRANT GILMORE, SECURrrY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 653 (Boston, Little Brown
1965).
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that Article Nine controls this priority fight is an issue on which courts do not
agree.
The lack of guidance in Article Nine is explained by the fact that Article
Nine itself excludes, at least, the creation of, set-off rights.2 The locked box
and blocked account of current asset-based lending practices of banks was not
a practice used by banks in the 1940's and 1950's when Article Nine was
created' The only place in Article Nine that addresses the priority of a non-
Article Nine claim of a bank against a secured party is section 9-306 which
addresses proceeds in insolvency-proceedings. 3 In this section, a bank's right
to set-off against money in a bank account is given priority over a secured
party's claim to the account as proceeds. The bank's priority in a given
insolvency proceeding cannot easily be compared to other situations. This is
because a secured party in insolvency gains the right to all proceeds that the
debtor receives within ten days of the initiation of insolvency proceedings,
regardless of whether the secured party can prove that the bank account
actually contained any proceeds at all. Outside of insolvency proceedings, the
secured party must prove that proceeds are still in the account.4
The approaches that courts have adopted to resolve the issues inherent in
a priority fight with a bank vary in response to a bank's actions. In other
words, case law turns on whether the bank is 1) setting off a loan against the
debtor's savings or checking account, or receiving a check in which it can
claim holder in due course rights; or 2) taking the money directly from the
debtor's customers pursuant to a locked box or blocked account arrangement
contractually created by the debtor and the bank.
2 U.C.C. §9-104 (i)(1990). Section 9-104 is the section in Article Nine that excludes various
transactions from Article Nine. The exclusion of section 9-104 states "[tihis act does not apply to any right
of set-off". What this exclusion covers is not clear and has divided the courts as discussed in Part I infra.
3 U.C.C.§ 9-306(4) (1990).
This is because U.C.C. section 9-306(2) (1990) requires the proceeds to be identifiable in order
for the secured party to have a an interest in the proceeds at all. Granted most courts allow the secured party
to use tracing principles in order to identify the proceeds in a commingled bank account. C.O. Funk &
Sons, Inc. v. Sullivan Equipment, Inc., 431 N.E.2d 370 (111. 1982). The most common tracing rule is "the
lowest intermediate balance rule". The rule works as follows: Assume that the account has $5,000 in it
when the proceeds in the amount of $1,000 are deposited in the account so that the account now has $6,000.
Next, the debtor takes out of the account $4,000 leaving now only $2,000. The tracing rule of the lowest
immediate balance allows the proceeds to remain in the account until the balance is withdrawn. If the
debtor had withdrawn $5,500 instead of $4,000 as above, and then deposited $7,000, the identifiable
proceeds interest in the account is only $500 because this was the lowest intermediate balance. The
proceeds interest does not increase when more money is deposited.
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This article explores whether priority rules should depend on the bank's
actions. Thus, the focal point of the discussion will revolve around a single
case which well represents the problem at issue in this paper.
In Orix Credit Alliance Inc., v. Sovran Bank5, the secured party, Orix,
represented itself as a purchase-money secured party because it had provided
the money that enabled the debtor, A.E. Finley and Associates, to buy a crane
that the debtor then leased as part of its ordinary course of business.6 Orix had
a perfected security interest in the crane. Sovran Bank ("Sovran"), the
defendant in the case is involved because "Finley maintained both a lending
and depository relationship with Sovran. Specifically, Sovran provided Finley
with a revolving line of credit and three bank accounts."7 Sovran also had a
security interest in now and after acquired inventory, and had a contractual
arrangement with the debtor providing that accounts receivable would be
deposited in a special account at Sovran, called a cash management account.
The money in this account was available only to Sovran for the purpose of
paying off the loans that Finley owed. Finley could write checks on a
different account, but such checks would be honored by Sovran only if it
released money into the debtor's account pursuant to a line of credit.
When the debtor bought the crane with Orix's money, Orix sent a letter
to the bank asking the bank to agree to subordinate any lien it had on the crane
to Orix's lien. This request was necessary because although Orix ordinarily,
as a purchase money secured party, would have had priority over the bank's
after-acquired security interest in the inventory, Orix apparently did not
comply with the requirements of section 9-312(3) in order to achieve such
priority. As a result, Sovran had a prior security interest in the debtor's
inventory.8 A subordination agreement was signed by the debtor's loan officer,
5 Orix Credit Alliance, Inc. v. Sovran Bank, 4 F.3d 1262 (4th Cir. 1993) (Interestingly, Justice
Powell, retired Justice from the U. S. Supreme Court, was sitting by designation and was one of two judges
in the majority).
6 Id. at 1264.
Id. at 1264.
8d. at 1273-74 (Ervin,C.J.,dissenting) (stating that a material question of fact was whether the
subordination agreement applied to proceeds. He points out that if Orix did not have priority under the
subordination agreement the bank should win. He notes that Orix did not perfect its security interest in the
crane until after the crane was received by the debtor. Thus, Orix failed to comply with section 9-312(3)(a).
The debtor entered into a lease with a third party before the crane was purchased. Orix's money was needed
to buy the crane which was then delivered directly to the lessee who received the crane before Orix
perfected its security interest. Judge Ervin was not troubled by the fact that the crane was delivered to the
lessee directly, and not the debtor, despite the fact that section 9-312(3)(a) says "the debtor receives
possession". Judge Ervin cites several other sections of Article Nine which broaden debtor rights to include
nondebtors. The problem with this approach is that debtor is defined in section 9-105(1)(d) to include
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Elspeth McClelland, and returned to Orix.
Approximately one year later, when the debtor was in default on its loans,
Sovran and the debtor agreed to raise money by a sale of some of the debtor's
leased equipment. One piece to be sold was Orix's crane. Orix agreed with
the debtor to allow the sale of its crane on the condition that the remainder of
its loan on the crane would be paid off with the sale proceeds. The crane and
other equipment were sold to a buyer who wire transferred $565,000 to the
cash management account controlled by Sovran. It used this money to pay off
someone other than the debtor when the debtor does not own the collateral. This does not help broaden the
word debtor in this case. The reason for the section 9-312(3)(a) requirement that the security interest be
perfected before the debtor receives possession of the collateral is the notice requirement. Under section
9-312(3)(c) notice must be given to holders of conflicting security interests before the debtor receives
possession of the collateral. The secured parties entitled to notice are the ones who recorded before the
purchase money party did. This elaborate structure was designed to protect the inventory financier who
might otherwise lend more money to the debtor on evidence that the debtor had more inventory which was
actually already encumbered. U.C.C. section 9-312 cmt.3. Given this purpose, there is a better approach
to the fixing of the date by which the purchase money secured party must be perfected when the debtor is
not getting possession of the collateral. The inventory financier is not going to rely on the lessee getting
possession. They are more likely going to rely on when the inventory is carred on the debtor's books.
Under this approach, it is not clear if Orix was perfected in time.
Judge Ervin has a second reason why pursuant to Article Nine the bank had priority if the subordination
agreement is not controlling. Section 9-312(3) only gives the purchase money secured party priority in the
collateral if it was "cash proceeds received on or before the delivery of the inventory to a buyer". Judge
Ervin points out that the buyer of the crane was the lessee. The lessee structured the sale as a sale/lease-
back so that a lender actually purchased the crane from the debtor. However, the crane never left the
lessee's possession so Judge Ervin concludes that Orix could never have received the proceeds before the
buyer received possession. Since the lender was the buyer, the judge concluded that the lender had
constructive possession when it entered into the sale/lease-back arrangement with the lessee which occurred
before the lessee paid the debtor for the crane.
Comment 3 to section 9-312 states that the interest in proceeds for a purchase money security interest
in inventory is limited in order to exclude from the the purchase money priority accounts receivable and
chattel paper proceeds that later may generate cash proceeds. The priority fight with these parties is to be
covered, according to Comment 3, by section 9-312(5) which gives priority to the party who was the first
to file.
Here the fight over the proceeds was not against an accounts or chattel paper financier, but merely the
inventory financier. Therefore, the court should have considered giving priority to Orix the purchase money
party over the'inventory financier's after-acquired property proceeds interest. After all, priority over the
inventory financier's after-acquired property interest is what section 9-312(3) is all about. Instead, Judge
Ervin misconstrued the law and gave priority to the bank. Under Judge Ervin's analysis, a purchase money
party always loses to the inventory financier if the collateral is sold to a lessee after the lessee has received
possession of the collateral under the lease. Just because the facts are a little different from the typical
inventory sale, is no reason to change the priority given to the purchase-money party. The priority for
accounts and chattel paper proceeds of inventory is different because these are common sources of
collateral. If a direct interest in accounts or chattel paper lost to a proceeds claimant, the accounts and
chattel paper would no longer be good sources of collateral,
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loans the debtor owed. Meanwhile, the debtor wrote a check to Orix to pay
for the crane. Sovran refused to pay the check because doing so would have
put the debtor $2,206 over the debtor's credit limit.9 This was due to the fact
that the debtor had $30,740 worth of additional checks that were presented for
payment on that day as well. The credit limit had been imposed on the debtor
by McClelland, the debtor's loan officer, even though the credit committee at
the bank had authorized a higher credit limit under which the payment to Orix
would have cleared. (Interestingly, McClelland was the person who agreed
to Orix's subordination agreement one year earlier.) Upon the refusal of
payment on the check, Orix sued Sovran claiming a proceeds interest. The
district court granted summary judgment to the bank which was upheld on
appeal, albeit with a dissent, from the Fourth Circuit.'0
This Article begins in Part I by exploring the priority rules the courts have
developed when a bank is asserting a set-off right to the secured party's
proceeds. In Part IH the holder in due course rules are briefly discussed.
These rules are relatively clear since they are derived from statute. The proper
place for the Orix case is in Part m since the bank did not set-off against the
funds, nor was the bank a holder in due course. The Orix court used, instead,
the "ordinary course of business" exception in Comment 3 to the U.C.C.,
section 9-306. This exception, according to the First, Fourth, and Seventh
Circuits, allows the bank to take free of Orix's claim." Part IV analyzes these
rules and suggests a unified way of analyzing the priority fight which does not
depart substantially from the current jurisprudence and yet gives priority to
Orix over the bank.
PART I THE BANK'S SET-OFF RIGHTS AGAINST THE SECURED
PARTY'S PROCEEDS
Courts are divided into two on the issue of priority fights between the
bank setting-off against a debtor's account and a secured creditor claiming a
proceeds interest in the money. To commence, all courts must address the
question: what is excluded under U.C.C. section 9-104(i). This section says
"[t]his article does not apply to any right of set-off'
9 Id. at 1265 n.3.
10 Id. at 1263-64.
i Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 4 F.3d 1262; Harley-Davidson Motor Co. Inc. v. Bank of New
England-Old Colony, N.A., 897 F.2d 611 (lst Cir. 1990); J.I. Case Credit Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of
Madison County, 991 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir. 1993).
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This section obviously excludes some aspects of set-offs from Article
Nine. One group of courts, constituting the majority view, say that section 9-
104(i) only excludes the creation of set-offs from Article Nine but not the
priority questions of who wins between the bank performing a set-off and a
secured party. The minority group concludes that section 9-104(i) excludes
all questions, in any way, concerning a set-off, including priority questions,
from the rules in Article Nine. 3 The group ignoring Article Nine relies on
common law rules of set-off to determine priority. This common law body is
also divided into two opinions.
On the question of the coverage of section 9-104(i), both sides have valid
arguments. The majority view, that section 9-104(i) does not exclude the
priority rule from Article Nine, is supported by a statement of the principle
draftsman of Article Nine, Grant Gilmore. 4 His reasoning as to why section
9-104(i) came into the Code is supported by the Code's drafting history.
The cases on the majority side of the issue rely heavily on Grant
Gilmore's statement on why section 9-104(i) was added to the Code. Gilmore
states:
[t]his exclusion is an apt example of the absurdities which result when
draftsmen attempt to appease critics by putting into a statute
something that is not in any sense wicked but is hopelessly irrelevant.
Of course a right of set-off is not a security interest and has never
been confused with one: the statute might as appropriately exclude
fan dancing. A bank's right of set-off against a depositor's account
is loosely referred to as a "banker's lien", but the "lien" usage has
12 Valley Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Cotton Growers Hail Ins. Inc., 747 P.2d 1225, 1229-30 (Ariz.
1st Ct. App. 1987) (involving a set-off by an insurance company rather than a bank); Insley Mfg. Corp. v.
Draper Bank & Trust, 717 P.2d 1341, 1344-47 (Utah 1986) (this case is one of the best reasoned opinions
on this issue); Southeastern Financial Corp. v. Nat'l Bank of Detroit, 377 N.W.2d 900,901 (Mich. Ct. App.
1985); Griffin v. Continental Am. Life Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 671, 673-74 (11 th Cir. 1984) (applying Georgia
law handed down by the Georgia Supreme Court from a certified question coming from the Eleventh
Circuit. Like the Cotton Growers Hail Ins. case, this case involved a set-off by an insurance company);
Coachman Indus., Inc. v. Security Trust & Say. Bank of Shenandoah, 329 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Iowa 1983);
Citizens Nat'l Bank of Whitley Co. v. Mid-States Dev. Co., Inc., 380 N.E.2d 1243, 1247-1248 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1978) (this case is the most widely cited case for this issue); Ass'n Discount Corp. v. Fidelity Union
Trust Co., 268 A.2d 330, 332 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970).
13 Bank of Crystal Springs v. First Nat'l Bank of Jackson, 427 So. 2d 968, 971 (Miss. 1983); State
Bank of Rose Creek v. First State Bank of Austin, 320 N.W. 2d 723, 725-26 (Minn. 1982); First Nat'l Bank
of Grand Prairie v. Lone Star Life Ins. Co., 529 S.W. 2d 1097 (Tex. 1975) (remarkable for its brevity).
14 GILMORE, supra note 1, at 315-16.
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never led anyone to think that the bank held a security interest in the
bank account. Banking groups were, however, concerned lest
someone, someday, might think that a bank's right of set-off, because
it was called a lien, was a security interest. Hence the exclusion,
which does no harm except to the dignity and self-respect of the
draftsmen. 5
The drafting history of Article Nine shows that the language now in
section 9-104(i) was added in the 1957 Official Code. 6 The changes that
were made between the 1952 Official Code and the 1957 Official Code were
to appease the New York Law Revision Commission's review and report on
the Code for the New York legislature.'7 During the hearings before the
Commission, Mr. Russo, counsel for Chase National Bank, testifying on
behalf of the New York Clearing House, stated that bankers were worried that
their Banker's lien or set-off would be considered a security interest under
Article Nine and require obtaining a security agreement and filing a financing
statement to obtain a right to money in the debtor's bank account."8 Mr. Russo
testified that such an event would necessitate the reconsideration of the bank's
loan policies, implying that fewer people would get credit. In response to Mr.
Russo's comments, Grant Gilmore stated:
[a]nother example of, I think, a useful point is this ...whether a bank's
so-called lien or set-off might be thought to be included within the
Code's definition of security interest. Now, of course, there was no
intention whatever that such an interest should be included. If on
consideration it is thought that the query has merit, I suggest that once
15 Id.
16 The 1952 the original Official Uniform Commercial Code had six types of transactions taken
out of the Code by section 9-104. In the 1957 first revision of the Official Uniform Commercial Code five
more types of transactions were added to the list of exclusions in section 9-104. Included in these five
additions was the language now found in section 9-104(i).
17 In reaction to the hearings and pending report by the New York Law Revision Commission, the
Editorial Board reactivated and appointed sub-committees for each article to consider the criticisms. With
cooperation of the Revision Commission, a new draft, the 1957 Official Uniform Commercial Code, was
ready within a few months of the publication of the Commission's report to be recommended to the
American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Herbert
F. Goodrich, Chairman Editorial Board, Foreword to UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, (The American Law
Institute & National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws eds., 1958).
Is STATE OF NEw YORK LAw REVISION COMMISSION REPORT, 2 HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIL CODE, 117-18 (photo reprint 1980)(1954).
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again the solution is entirely simple. A bank that has a banker's lien
and set-off should be clearly excluded by a simple phrase '9
The cases on the minority side of the issue do not address the issue of the
intention of the draftsmen in a satisfactory fashion. Instead, they rely on Peter
Coogan, William E. Hogan, Detlev F. Vagts and Julian B. McDonnell's
assessment of the situation in their treatise on Article nine." However, these
authors do not present evidence that the intention of the draftsmen was other
than that represented by Professor Gilmore.2
One argument is that certain sections in section 9-104 expressly take their
reference out of the exclusion of the priority rule and section 9-104(i) does
not. For example, the exclusion of mechanic liens in section 9-104(c) and the
exclusion of transfers of interests in land in section 9-1040) both make
reference to the Code sections that cover the priority rule between a fight
between these interests and a perfected secured party. The courts and
commentators argue that since section 9-104 expressly keeps the priority rule
in Article Nine for some exclusions, a failure to expressly do so in section 9-
104(i) means a total exclusion.
There is, however, a distinction between these sections and the set-off
exclusion in section 9-104(i). Article Nine addresses priority fights regarding
mechanic's liens and land transfers in the sections that specifically address
19 Id. at 164. It is interesting to note that at the 1954 hearings before the New York Law Revision
Commission, Professor Gilmore seemed most willing to add language to the Code to address the Bankers'
set-off concern, whereas in 1965 in his book, Gilmore ridicules the reason for adding the language in
section 9-104(i). Professor Gilmore's conciliatory remarks at the hearings may have been due in part to
remarks he made the previous day at the hearings describing the memorandum read by Mr. Russo and
others as representatives of the New York Clearing House Subcommittee. Professor Gilmore said that
"[t]he memoranda read this morning on behalf of the New York Clearing House...were so riddled with
mistakes, inaccuracies, misreadings and misconstructions as to be largely untrustworthy and as to throw
grave doubt on the professional competence in this field of those who prepared the memoranda....These are
harsh words, deliberately chosen, which I shall be prepared to document before you gentlemen tomorrow.".
Id. at 151.
20 PETER F. COOGAN, ET AL.,SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§3.15[2] (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc, 1990).
21 These authors do not raise many arguments against relying on Grant Gilmore's explanation on
why section 9-104(i) was added to the Code other than to say that section 9-104(i) does not say that only
creation issues were excluded and that the banker's' concern with Article Nine probably covered ultimate
priority not just creation problems. See supra notes 14-16. The drafting history suggests that the banker's
concern, at least that which was expressed at the hearings, concerns the creation of a right of set-off and
not their priority vis-a-vis a security interest.
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these problems. In contrast, the priority rule in Article Nine for set-offs,
outside of insolvency, is in the general priority rule, section 9-102.
Even more persuasive is the exclusion of landlord liens in section 9-
104(b) which, like the exclusion of set-offs, is an exclusion with no reference
to priority. Most courts conclude that the priority fight between the landlord
and the secured party is covered by common law principles, not Article
Nine.22 It is interesting to note, that these common-law principles look very
much like Article Nine. They give priority to the lien that was created first in
time.
The landlord lien exclusion in section 9-104(b) was added as one of the
original six exclusions when the first official Code was promulgated in 1952.
Combined with the landlord lien exclusion in section 9-104(b) was an
exclusion of any lien on real estate. The U.C.C. Comments indicate that the
draftsmen considered this exclusion to be self-explanatory. In the official
Code of 1957 the exclusion for liens on real estate was separated from
landlord's liens. When real estate liens were separated from landlord liens
and put in section 9-104(j), language was added that reserves in Article Nine
the fixtures priority problem that is addressed in section 9-313.
This drafting history can be seen as supporting a conclusion that the
exclusion of the landlord lien from Article Nine was meant to be a total
exclusion. The drafting history to the set-off exclusion, however, suggests just
the opposite.
The main argument against the above mentioned arguments, based on
other sections of 9-104, is that if subsection (i) was intended to take all set-off
questions out of Article Nine, why does Article Nine address the priority
between the two competing parties in insolvency proceedings, as written in
section 9-306(4). If the drafters of Article Nine had intended a full exclusion
then they should have put in the language "except as provided in insolvency
proceedings in section 9-306(4)". Given that they did not, it is probable that
the language in section 9-104(i) was added in 1957, for the reasons offered by
Grant Gilmore, and that priority rules were not intended to be excluded by the
2 Kuemmerle v. United New Mexico Bank, 831 P.2d 976 (N.M. 1992) (the secured party wins
under the common law rule of first in time, first in right and benefits from the court's erroneous view of
when the security interest attached for purposes of perfection. Although the debtor did not have rights in
the collateral yet, the court held the security interest attached when the security agreement was signed.);
First State Bank of Maple Park v. DeKaIb Bank, 530 N.E. 2d 544 (111. 2nd App. Ct 1988)(the secured party
wins under the common law); Ex-Cell-O Corp. v. Lincor Properties of Ariz., 762 P.2d 594 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1988)(again, the secured party wins under the common law since its interest had attached before the goods
were brought into the leasehold).
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section 9-104(i) language despite the fact that section 9-104 does this for other
interests.
Once a court takes a position on the question of what is excluded under
section 9-104(i), the next question to be addressed is what priority rule will
control the fight either under the Code or the common law. If the court
follows the majority position, then the priority rule is in Article Nine. A
drawback is that the only express priority rule for the secured party/bank set-
off fight applies in insolvency proceedings.
This forces the courts to the general priority rule set out in section 9-201
which says: "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this Act a security agreement
is effective according to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of
the collateral and against creditors." Under this section, the secured party
always beats the bank's set-off. The courts on the majority side of the issue
have so held.23
This language has been in the Code since the first official Code in 1952.
The relevant comment has not changed. The issue of whether the language "is
effective" means merely that the security agreement remains attached to the
collateral even if it is in the hands of a purchaser or other creditor. It could
mean this, but still neglect to address priority. The Comment to section 9-201,
however, suggests that it covers priority as well. It discusses examples of
Code rules which fit into the "except as otherwise provided by this Act"
phrase, and therefore control over the rule set forth in section 9-201. Sections
mentioned in the Comment include sections such as section 9-307 that allow
a buyer in the ordinary course of business to take free of a perfected security
interest. If the Comment had just discussed section 9-307 this would be
consistent with construing the rule in section 9-201 as limited to attachment
and not priority.
The Comment also discusses sections like section 9-301 and section 9-312
which subordinate secured parties to buyers and other creditors as part of
priority fights. This suggests that section 9-201 is also a priority rule that
2 Insley Mfg. Corp. v. Draper Bank & Trust, 717 P.2d 1341, 1347 Utah 1986); Southeastern
Financial Corp. v. Nat'l Bank of Detroit, 377 N.W.2d 900,901-02 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985); Citizens Nat'l
Bank of Whitley County v. Mid-States Dev. Co., Inc., 380 N.E.2d 1243, 1248 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978);
Coachman Indus., Inc., v. Security Trust & Say. Bank of Shenandoah, 329 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Iowa 1983)
(not basing priority on section 9-201, instead finding priority for the secured party in section 9-306 by
implication that if the bank wins in insolvency proceedings in section 9-306(4) then the secured party wins
outside of insolvency prodeedings. Section 9-201 is a stronger basis for the priority rule than section 9-
306).
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controls unless the Code otherwise specifies, which it does not outside of
insolvency proceedings.
The cases that conclude that all issues are excluded from Article Nine take
their authority from the common law which pre-dates Article Nine's adoption.
These cases follow one of two rules called: "the legal rule" and "the equitable
rule" respectively. "The legal rule" is followed by a clear majority of states.
It allows a bank to keep money taken by a set-off unless the bank had
knowledge or sufficient notice to put it on inquiry that the money belonged to
someone other than the debtor.24
"The equitable rule" is quite different. In jurisdictions with "the legal
rule" a bank usually wins in a priority fight. Just the opposite occurs in
jurisdictions with "the equitable rule". This is because under "the equitable
rule" a bank can not set-off against funds that are not the debtor's unless the
bank has acted in detrimental reliance on the deposit, or in some other way,
established it had the equities to the money. In other words, even if a bank did
not have a scintilla of information that the money belonged to someone else,
it would still not be able to set-off unless it had acted in reliance.
It is difficult to see how a bank performing a set-off would detrimentally
rely. Normally a bank detrimentally relies on a set-off when it releases
collateral or makes a loan in reliance on a set-off. If a bank, after setting off,
made another loan to the debtor which it would not have done in the absence
of the set-off, the bank should have priority over a competing secured party
under "the equitable rule". However, it is difficult to imagine that a bank,
which has been forced to set-off in order to satisfy an outstanding
indebtedness, would agree to lend yet more funds to such an unreliable
borrower.
It is interesting to note that two of the three jurisdictions expressly holding
that section 9-104(i) takes all issues of set-off outside of Article Nine have
adopted "the equitable rule" under which the secured party is likely to win.25
Even though these jurisdictions depart from the majority, which follows the
priority rule borrowed from Article Nine, the result in both cases is that the
24 Cherokee Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Northern Bank and Trust Co., 561 S.W.2d 310,313 (Ark. 1978);
State Highway Comm'n of Mo. v. Thelnor, Inc., 543 S.W.2d 229, 233 (Mo. 2nd Ct. App. 1976); Emile v.
Bright, 203 So.2d 328, 329 (Fla. 4th DCA. 1967); Westerly Community Credit Union, v. Indus. Nat'l Bank
of Providence, 240 A.2d 586, 590-91 (R.I. 1968).
2 National Indem. Co. v. Spring Branch State Bank, 348 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. 1961) (allowing an
insurance company to retrieve money it had taken in a set- off against an insurance agent's account); Agard
v. Peoples' Nat'l Bank of Shakopee, 211 N.W. 825, 827 (Minn. 1927) (bank set-off against money in a real
estate agent's account collected for someone else by the agent).
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secured party is likely to win over the setting-off bank. Compare this rule
with the next rule in which a bank is not setting off against the debtor's bank
account but receiving a check as a holder in due course.
What would have happened to Orix's fight with Sovran Bank, if the bank
had set-off against the debtor's account? In almost all jurisdictions Orix
would have won whether the court took the priority rule out of Article Nine,
or not. Even in a jurisdiction that would apply common law to the priority
issue and include "the legal rule" and not "the equitable rule", Orix still would
have probably had priority. In the Orix opinion, the Fourth Circuit assumed
that the bank had knowledge of Orix's claim to the money.' Even in this type
of jurisdiction, Orix's claim would win as long as the bank had notice of the
claim.
Part H THE BANK'S RIGHTS AS A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE OF
A CHECK THAT CONSTITUTES THE SECURED PARTY'S
PROCEEDS.
The holder in due course rules across the country are fairly consistent
since the test for a holder in due course ("HDC") is defined in Article Three
of the Commercial Code.27 Since there have been few non-uniform
amendments to the definition of a holder in due course (HDC), the cases are
not entirely consistent. There are several requirements to becoming an HDC.
First, a bank must be a holder of the instrument. This requires that the
bank be a holder of the check. A person can become a holder through several
different means. Since checks are not bearer instruments, a bank can become
a holder of the check if it is issued to the bank by the drawer, or if it is
negotiated to the bank.2" Typically, a check used to pay off a loan will be a
check written by the borrower to the bank. In this case, a bank would be in
possession of the check and would be the person to whom the check is
payable. This makes the bank a holder of the check.29
26 Orix Credit Alliance, Inc. v. Sovran Bank, 4 F.3d 1262, 1266 n.7 (1993) (reviewing court takes
the facts most favorably in light of Orix's complaint since the District Court had given summary judgment
to the bank).
U.C.C. §3-302(a) (1990).
U.C.C. §3-201 (1990) Negotiation takes place by delivery alone if the check has become bearer
paper by an indorsement in blank. If the check has not become bearer paper, then negotiation occurs when
the check is delivered with the required endorsement.
29 U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (1990).
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The next requirement to becoming an HDC is that a bank must give value.
Value is defined to cover the taking of an instrument in total or partial
payment of a pre-existing indebtedness.3a If a bank uses a check to pay off a
debtor's loan in part or in full, then it has given value.
Next, a bank must take the check without notice of several different
events.3" The only type of notice that will typically come up in a fight with a
secured party is that a bank took without notice of the claim to proceeds by the
secured party. 2
Notice is defined as having knowledge of, or reason to know of, the claim
from all the surrounding facts and circumstances known to the bank at the
time the bank performs all other requisites to be a HDC. If the bank has reason
to know under the surrounding circumstances, the bank is considered to have
notice of the claim of the secured party and cannot be a HDC.
Not all courts are in agreement regarding what constitues the notice
portion of the HDC test. Some jurisdictions follow cases suggesting that only
knowledge by the alleged HDC will defeat HDC status.33 Two states, until
recently, had statutes that defined notice within Article Three differently. 4
Virginia and New York defined notice in general to mean knowledge or bad
30 U.C.C. §3-303(a)(3) (1990).
31 U.C.C. §3-302(a)(2) (1990) The other types of notice that destroy HDC status are: (l)notice that
the instrument is overdue or has been dishonored, or that there is an uncured default in payment of another
instrument that has been issued as part of the same series; (2)notice of an unauthorized signature or that the
check has been altered; and (3) notice of any defenses to the instrument or right of recoupment).
32 U.C.C. §3-306 (1990) The official comment states that claim to the instrument includes a claim
to a lien which would cover the claim of the secured party which has a perfected security interest in the
check because it is cash proceeds. However, the proceeds must be identifiable. See §9-306(3)(b) (1990).
33 Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. American Express Co., 542 N.E.2d 1090, 1093-96 (1989);
Citizens Nat'l Bank of Englewood v. Fort Lee Say. & Loan Assoc., 213 A.2d 315, 318 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1965) In Gen. Inv. Corp. v. Angelini, 278 A.2d 193, the New Jersey Supreme Court applied a duty to
investigate in a consumer home construction finance case but they did not admit to doing so. They said
that the lender who knew that the note payments were to begin 60 days after completion of the home
improvement work and could be calculated that this meant that the work would be completed in 10 days,
should have inquired whether the work had been actually completed. The court limited its holding to
consumer finance cases. Id. at 200; Lawton v. Walker, 343 S.E.2d 335, 338 (Va. 1986); Grinzinski v. First
Fin. Centers, Inc., 1994 WL 107289 (Ohio CL App. 2 Dist. 1994) (an unpublished opinion subject to Rule
2 of the Ohio Supreme Court which imposes restrictions and limitations on the use of unpublished
opinions.) Like New Jersey, Ohio has consumer finance cases reading obligations to inquire into the good
faith prong of the HDC inquiry. Arcanum Nat'l Bank v. Hessler, 433 N.E. 2d 204, 209-11 (Ohio. 1982).
_U N.Y. U.C.C. Law §3-304 (McKinney 1991); Va. Code Ann. §8.3-304(7) (Michie 1991)
(repealed 1992).
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faith. Bad faith in Article Three was defined as honesty in fact,35 which the
Virginia courts adopted for the bad faith part of the HDC notice requirement.36
New Jersey and Ohio also have case law adopting this same test, but their
legislatures have yet to enact any such statutory law.37 However, Virginia,
New Jersey and Ohio have recently adopted the new version of Article
Three.3" In this version of Article Three, a separate general definition of
notice within Article Three, which Virginia and New York had originally, and
New York still has, is not given. Therefore, the general definition of notice
has to arise from the general purpose definition section of the Uniform
Commercial Code, section 1-201, which is incorporated into Article Three by
section 3-103(d). Section 1-201 adopts the reason to know standard. Thus the
vast majority of jurisdictions make it clear that reason to know will suffice to
defeat HDC status.
A case illustrative of this point is Valley Bank v. Monarch Investment
Industries Co.39 In Valley Bank, a thief sold a stolen backhoe to a consumer
who wrote a personal check made out to Monarch Investment Co., ostensibly
the thief's employer. The thief took the check to the purchaser's bank and
asked the bank to replace the check with a cashier's check by telling the bank
that his employer, Monarch, did not like to take personal checks. The bank
issued the cashier's check without ever contacting Monarch Investment to
verify the information given by the thief. The thief gave the cashier's check
to Monarch Coins, which also did business as Monarch Investment, to buy
gold.' Monarch claimed to be an HDC of the cashier's check.
Monarch called the bank. The testimony about what was said in this phone
conversation is very important because it illustrates part of the HDC test. The
bank agent said that she made it clear to Monarch that the cashier's check was
from the purchasers of a backhoe and was to be used to pay for it. The court
said that if this had been the only testimony at trial, then Monarch would have
had reason to know that the cashier's check could only be used for the
purchase of a backhoe, and not coins. However, a Monarch employee testified
3s U.C.C. §1-201(19) The new version of Article Three now defines good faith within Article
Three. This'definition includes "the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing". There
is also now a definition of ordinary care. See U.C.C. §3-103(4),(7) (1990).
36 Lawton, 343 S.E. 2d at 337-38.
37 Grinzinski, 1994 WL 107289 at *1; Citizens Nat'l Bank of Englewood, 213 A.2d at 318.
39 1995 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. Ch.28 sectionl (West); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §1303.01-.70
(Anderson 1994 Supp.); Va. Code Ann.§8.3A-101-605 (Michie 1994 Cum. Supp.).
39 Valley Bank v. Monarch Inv. Co., 800 P.2d 634 (Idaho 1990).
40 Id. at 635-36.
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that the phone conversation with the bank only included a question by the
bank regarding whether Monarch was calling about the payment for the
backhoe, to which Monarch responded that they were calling about the
payment for coins and then nothing more was said on this topic. There was
agreement however, that the bank told Monarch that the cashier's check had
been issued that morning, that the signatures on the cashier's check was
authorized and that the bank had no notice that the check was stolen.4 The
court concluded that because of the conflicting evidence there was evidence
to support the magistrate's verdict for Monarch.42
The Uniform Commercial Code does not define "reason to know", other
than to say it is determined from all circumstances and facts known at the
time. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts discusses reason to know as
"different from knowledge and should have known. 43 It defines "knowledge"
as conscious awareness of the fact, and "should hav& known" as requiring a
reasonable duty to acquire more information once a person knows sufficient
facts to arouse suspicion. According to the Restatement, a person has reason
to know a fact when he has information from which an inference can be drawn
that the fact exists." This comports with the requirement in the Code that
reason to know is to be drawn from the facts and circumstances known by the
purported HDC at the time.
A slightly different definition of reason to know is defined by the
Restatement (Second) of Agency.45 In addition to the inference that can be
drawn from the facts, this definition adds that a person has reason to know of
a fact if "there is such a substantial chance of [the claim or defense's]
existence that, ... exercising. reasonable care with reference to the matter in
question, ... [the HDC's] action would be predicated upon the assumption of
its possible existence."46 In addition, if the possible HDC has superior
intelligence, then the question is whether a reasonable person with this
superior intelligence would infer the claim or defense from the facts at hand.47
In the HDC context, this definition has been adopted by at least one court.48
41 Id. at 636.
42 Id. at 639.
43 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §19 cmt. b (1979).
Id.
45 Restatement (Second) of Agency, §9, cmt. d (1958).
4 Id.
47 Id.
49 EL. Von Gohren v. Pacific Nat'l Bank of Wash., 505 P.2d 467, 472 (Wash. App. 1973).
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What would have been the result of Orix if the bank had received a check
from the debtor paying off the loan with Orix's proceeds? If the bank had
claimed HDC status would it have had notice of Orix's claim to the money?
As a financial institution, the bank would be in a superior position to
understand the financing aspects of the debtor's business. The bank had
several facts available to it at the time.
First, the bank knew of Orix's security interest in the crane. This was
more than merely seeing Orix's financing statement. Recall that the previous
year, Elspeth McClelland, the debtor's loan officer, signed a letter to Orix
agreeing on behalf of the bank to subordinate its interest in the crane to Orix's
purchase money security interest.49 One year later, the debtor was in default
on the bank's loans and the bank declared default on the debtor's loans on
September 4, 1991. On September 11, 1991, the debtor and the bank
discussed the debtor's financial position in light of his default. The wire
transfer of the proceeds from the sale of the crane was made by the buyer on
September 20, 1991. It is not stated in the opinion, but it is highly likely that
the debtor discussed with McClelland his financial plan of selling off leased
equipment, including Orix's crane. Even if Orix was not identified in the
discussion, given the fact that McClelland had signed the subordination
agreement and was the one most likely to have had the discussion with the
debtor on September 11, 1991, she had reason to know that money resulting
from the sale of the crane would be claimed by Orix. Also,it is irrelevant that
McClelland may not have been consciously aware that the money was coming
from Orix's crane. She had facts that would raise the inference that the money
was from the sale of Orix's crane. She did not need to gather more
information. Under the reason to know standard, consciousness of the fact
need not be shown since that is the definition of knowledge, not notice. It is
notice of a claim to the money that precludes a bank from being an HDC.
The importance of the "ordinary course of business" rule from a bank's
perspective is that knowledge is irrelevant under this test and no other. A
bank wins even if it knows or has reason to know that money belongs to
another and although under the set-off rules and HIDC rules this knowledge
would defeat the rights of the bank.
49 Orix Credit Alliance, Inc. v. Sovran Bank, 4 F.3d 1263, 1264. (4th Cir. 1993).
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Part III BANK'S RIGHTS IN TAKING THE SECURED PARTY'S
PROCEEDS IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF THEIR BUSINESS
The Fourth Circuit, in Orx, does nothing novel in applying the "ordinary
course of business" rule. Comment 2(c) to section 9-306, the proceeds
section, states:
[w]here cash proceeds are covered into the debtor's checking account
and paid out in the operation of the debtor's business, recipients of
the funds of course take free of any claim which the secured party
may have in them as proceeds. What has been said relates to
payments and transfers in ordinary course. The law of fraudulent
conveyances would no doubt in appropriate cases, support recovery
of proceeds by a secured party from a transferee out of ordinary
course or otherwise in collusion with the debtor to defraud the
secured party.
Several circuit courts of appeal have interpreted this comment to allow a
bank to keep the money even if it knew the money was the secured party's
proceeds.5 This rule is clearly different from any set-off rule or the HDC
rule, wherein knowledge would defeat a bank's interest. The question
remains, just how do the facts of these cases justify such a divergent rule. The
First and Seventh Circuits conclude that the bank will be forced to give back
the funds only if it acted improperly, defined here as fraudulent or collusive
conduct.52 The question is whether the courts are applying this Comment
correctly given the facts in the cases. It is submitted here that they are not.
The facts fall into three basic patterns. The first pattern is the one found
in cases such as Orix. In these cases, the third party makes payment directly
to the bank. In the second pattern, the debtor, or someone on his behalf,
authorizes the bank to take money out of the debtor's bank account. The third
pattern is a variant of the second, but instead of authorization to take money
so U.C.C. §9-306 cmt. 2(c) (1990).
51 Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 4 F.3d 1263; J.I. Case Credit Corp., v. First Nat'l Bank of Madison
County, 991 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir. 1993); Harley-Davidson Motor Co., Inc. v. Bank of New England-Old
Colony, 897 F.2d 611,619 (1st Cir. 1990).
52 J.1. Case Credit Corp., 991 F.2d at 1277; (stating that collusion is involved when the bank
knows that the payment of the money is in violation of the secured party's rights.); Harley-Davidson Motor
Co., Inc., 897 F.2d at 622-23.
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out of an account, the debtor or someone acting for the debtor, pays the bank
by writing a check to the bank.
The first pattern is illustrated by the Orix case and General Electric Co.
Lighting Business Group v. Halmar Distributors, Inc. 3 In Orix the third party
made a wire transfer to the bank's blocked account. The debtor had no access
to this account; only the bank could reach the money. In General Electric
Lighting, the third party sent its check to a lock box. The court said that the
lock box was in control of the bank and thus the debtor never had any interest
in the money.' The bank in General Electric Lighting took the checks out of
the lock box, which was a post office box, and endorsed the checks over to
itself.5" The bank's purpose was to gain control of the money to be applied
against its debt because the checks were made payable to the debtor.
The second pattern is illustrated by Tuloka Affiliates Inc. v. Security State
Bank56. In Tuloka, the debtor owned two businesses, one which sold mobile
homes and the other which sold recreational vehicles. The bank and the
finance company may not have known of one another's interest because the
bank financed the recreational vehicle business and the finance company
financed the mobile home business. Also, the bank's security interest was
unperfected. And, the two companies were located in two different states.
Problems developed when the finance company, notified by the debtor of a
mobile home sale, sent a draft to be paid on the recreational vehicle
company's bank account instead of the mobile home business account. This
53 General Elec. Co. Lighting Bus. Group v. Halmar Distrib., 116 B.R. 328 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1990).
54 lit at 332-34. The bankruptcy court does not rely exclusively on Comment 2(c) to rule in favor
of the bank. The court said that the debtor never "received" the proceeds when the checks were sent to the
lock box. Since section 9-306(2) gives a security interest only in identifiable proceeds "received by the
debtor", the court concluded that the secured party had no interest in the funds at all and, therefore, there
was no priority fight. The court bases its conclusion on the fact that the third parties sent their checks to
a lock box from which the bank collected the third party checks. Lock box arrangements are services the
bank provides much like bookkeeping services for its customers. The bank picks up the checks by going
to the lockbox several times per day. The lock box ii in the post office. The third parties make the check
out to the debtor and send it to the post office box address. It is hard to imagine that these checks are never
received by the debtor. Under the court's reasoning, any debtor who used the services of the bank in
picking up and processing its checks would destroy the proceeds interest of the inventory financier. The
fact that the bank probably had in this case additional contractual agreements with the debtor allowing them
to take the checks collected from the post office box and use the checks to pay off the debtor's loan should
not change the conclusion of whether the debtor received the money when the checks were addressed to it
and sent to its post office box.
55 Id. at 331.
56 Tuloka Affiliates, Inc. v. Security State Bank, 627 P.2d 816 (Kan. 1981).
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mistake probably occured because the finance company was doing business
with the recreational vehicle business as its debtor. The money from the sale
had gone into the mobile home account.57
Shortly thereafter, the bank learned that the debtor had sold some
recreational vehicles in violation of the bank's security agreement. When they
called the debtor and told him of this violation, the debtor authorized the bank
to take money out of the mobile home company's account. However, the bank
could not have set-off against this account since their lending arrangement was
with the recreational vehicle business not the mobile home business.5"
Moreover, the authorization by the debtor arguably may have been under
duress. When the debtor had previously sold recreational vehicles in violation
of the bank's agreement, the bank had informed the debtor that they would
"press charges" the next time vehicles were sold without the bank's consent.
Consequently, the debtor may have agreed to the taking of the home
company's money under the pressure of, at the very least motivated by,
previously made threats.59 The bank refused to pay the finance company's
draft on the recreational vehicle company's account and raided the money in
the mobile-home account which constituted finance company proceeds. The
court allowed the bank to keep the funds.'
The third pattern is perhaps the most consistent with the "ordinary course
of business". This is where a check is sent by the debtor to the bank. In this
situation, the bank would be protected from the secured party's claim if the
bank were an HDC. If the bank had notice of the claim of the secured party,
which would preclude them from being a HDC, it is questionable that they
would be able to claim the money under the "ordinary course of business"
exception. By comparing the facts in J.L Case Credit Corp v. First National
Bank of Madison County6 and the facts in Harley-Davidson Motor Co., Inc.,
v. Bank of New England-Old Colony62 this issue is further explored.
7 Id. at 817.
58 Id. at 823 (Prager, J., dissenting).
59 Id. It would suprise most people if the bank had not made the same threat now that the debtor
was violating the bank's security agreement for the second time. This was not in the opinion, but it is
highly likely that the debtor was authorizing the bank's grab under pressure of an immediate pressing of
criminal charges if the debtor rufused to allow the taking of the money from the other business's account.
60 Id. at 820.
61 J.L Case Credit Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Madison County, 991 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir. 1993).
62 Harley-Davidson Motor Co., Inc. v. Bank of New England-Old Colony, 897 F.2d 611 (lst Cir.
1990).
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In the J.L Case Credit Corp. case, the debtor sold agricultural equipment
and used cars. The bank was aware that J.I. Case held a security interest in the
agricultural equipment. In the five months in question, the debtor sent checks
to the bank totaling $603,000. Whereas, in the previous two years he had
averaged payments of $4,000 and $10,000 per month respectively. Although
the bank knew that the debtor was in financial trouble and believed that
payment on the debtor's loans was doubtful, the court notes that the bank was
in no way influenced by these payments. The district court held that the bank
was not a HDC and did not take the money in the "ordinary course of
business".63 The Seventh Circuit reversed not reaching the HDC argument.'
The Seventh Circuit noted that the district court inappropriatley used a
"should have known" standard instead of an "actual knowledge" standard. 5
However, the court did not discuss the rationale behind the "actual
knowledge" standard which is at minimum the applicable standard for the
HDC discussion.
As this paper has illustrated, there is no standard for the "ordinary course
of business" rule since knowledge that the money is the secured party's does
not defeat the bank's right to the money. The J.L Case Credit Corp. court
held that the bank will not take money in the "ordinary course of business" if
it acts with knowledge or reckless disregard that the payment to the bank is in
violation of the secured party's security agreement.' Thus, even if the bank
knew that the money was J.I. Case's proceeds, the bank would be able to keep
it.
In J.L Case Credit Corp., at least, the bank had a credible agrument that
it did not have reason to know that the checks included J.I. Case's proceeds.
This would allow the bank to keep the money in spite of the claim of J.I. Case
because they would be a HDC. Note that this result is under the HDC "reason
to know" test, not the test the court uses which is knowledge or reckless
disregard that the payment is a violation of the security agreement.
In the Harley-Davidson case the bank was a junior secured party to the
debtor's new and used motorcycles. It knew that Harley-Davidson held a
senior security interest in the cycles.67 The bank however required the debtor
to give it the title documents to the cycles. When one of the cycles was sold
63 J.. Case Credit Corp., 991 F.2d at 1273-74.
( Id. at 1279-80.
65 Id. at 1277-78.
6 Id. at 1279-80.
67 Harley-Davidson Motor Co, Inc., 897 F.2d at 613-14.
BANKS AGAINST SECURED PARTIES
the debtor had to pay the bank in order to procure these title documents.68 As
a junior secured party to the cycles, the bank knew or should have known, that
its interest in the money it was receiving was from the sale of cycles was
junior to Harley-Davidson's interest and that in taking the money it was in
violation of Harley-Davidson's security agreement.
Unlike the Seventh Circuit, the First Circuit does not discuss knowledge
at all. Rather the inquiry is whether the bank acted improperly or
fraudulently.69 The court further limits the question of improper behavior to
the new motor cycles that were not financed by the bank. Consequently, the
court summarily concludes that the bank acted properly in taking the money.
The court ignores the fact that Harley-Davidson was the senior secured
party to the used cycles as well. Since the bank, financed the purchase of the
old cycles, it could have obtained priority over Harley-Davidson by going
through the steps outlined in section 9-312(3); something it did not do.7  The
section 9-312(3) requirements are in place to protect the previously filed party.
The careful balancing in this section purports to provide protection to the the
prior inventory financier, but the court actually gives priority to the
subsequent secured party. Not suprisingly, the court does not even mention
section 9-312(3). Instead, by using the "ordinary course of business"
exception, the court avoids the Article Nine analysis that would defeat the
bank's claim to the money and instead adopts a rule which allows each party
priority to the cycles that it financed.
Unlike the J.I Case Credit Corp. case, the bank in Harley-Davidson could
not be an HDC of the checks because it knew the money belonged to Harley-
Davidson. Arguably, the bank even knew that the payment to them was in
violation of Harley-Davidson's security agreement thereby defeating their
right to the money under the Seventh Circuit's standard in J.L Case Credit
Corp.. Nonetheless, the bank won, at least as to the money from the used
cycles.7 As to the money from the sale of new cycles, the court remanded the
case for a factual determination of whether the bank acted improperly and to
determine what constitutes improper behavior.
Not all courts are doing such an injustice to the rules of Article Nine. The
Eighth Circuit in Barber-Greene Co. v. National City Bank of Minneapolis72
69 Id. at 614.
69 Id. at 622.
70 Id. at 616-17.
71 Id. at 622-23.
72 Barber-Greene Co. v. Nat'l City Bank of Minneapolis, 816 F.2d 1267 (8th Cir. 1987).
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faced a situation like the Orix and General Electric Co. Lighting Business
Group v. Hamlar Distributors cases. In these cases the accounts receivables
were paid directly into an account controlled by the bank. When the bank
took money that was proceeds of a party that had priority under Article Nine,
it argued that it took the money in the ordinary course of their business
arrangement with the debtor. The Eighth Circuit held that this was not an
ordinary course arrangement. The court said that, at the very least, ordinary
course presupposed an account over which the debtor had control in deciding
who to pay.73 In Farmers and Merchants National Bank, Fairview v. Sooner
Cooperative, Inc.,74 the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the bank's
knowledge of the contents of a financing statement filed by the secured party
with priority precluded the bank from taking the money in the ordinary course.
The court reached this conclusion despite the fact that the debtor sent the bank
a check that the debtor had written on an account containing proceeds.75
Are the First, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits correct in their holdings that
the ordinary course of business transfer can ignore priority rules in Article
Nine and holder in due course rules in Article Three? Is Comment 2(c) to
section 9-312 controlling at all? If the answer to these questions is no, what
rule should govern the priority fight between the secured party and the
common law rights of the bank? These are the questions addressed in Part IV.
PART IV WHO SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO THE SPOILS?
Perhaps Comment 2(c) to section 9-312 should be ignored. After all, as
a Comment, unless it is enacted into law, it is no more than persuasive
authority. It is certainly less controlling than Article Nine statutory language.
Is Comment 2(c) inconsistent with Article Nine and if so, should it be
disregarded? To answer this question an analysis of Article Nine is needed.
Article Nine has several general priority rules as set out in section 9-312
which establishes a hierarchy of priority unless a specific rule provide an
exception to this general hierarchy. The first creditor to file or perfect its
interest in the collateral wins under the general priority rule.76 Section 9-312
applies not only to the priority ordering as to the original collateral but also
7 Id. at 1272-73.
74 Farmers and Merchants Nat'l Bank, Fairview v. Sooner Cooperative, Inc., 766 P.2d 325 (Okla.
1988).
73 Id. at 326.
76 U.C.C. §9-312(5) (1990).
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the proceeds of that collateral." Unless a specific rule provides a controlling
exception, the creditor with priority as to the original collateral will have
priority as to the proceeds of that collateral. This raises the question of what
specific rules control are exceptions from this general rule.
The first specific rule applies to the collateral and proceeds of a purchase
money security interest in inventory and is included in section 9-312 along
with the general rules.78  This rule gives priority to the purchase money
inventory secured party even over previously filed or perfected parties if
certain steps are taken.79 However, they are given priority in the proceeds of
inventory only as to cash proceeds received by the debtor on or before the date
the inventory is delivered to the buyer.80 A purchase money secured party in
collateral other than inventory has no such limitation and is given priority over
previously filed parties both as to the collateral and the proceeds." The
specific rule limiting the proceed's rights of an inventory financier only limits
the priority as to proceeds of a purchase money party who does not have
priority under sections 9-312(5),(6) because they were not the first to file or
perfect. If they have priority because they were the first to file or perfect, then
the limitation in section 9-312(3) does not apply, and they do not even need
section 9-312(3) to win as to the origional collateral or its proceeds.
What proceeds then, would be excluded under this rule in section 9-
312(3)? Some illustrations should be helpful. First, note that accounts,
chattel paper, instruments and goods are not cash proceeds.8 2 Assume that
creditor #1 has the first filed security interest in the debtor's now owned and
7 U.C.C. §9-312(6) (1990) This statutory section says that the filing or perfection date of the
original collateral is to be the filing or perfection date for purposes of perfection as to the proceeds. This
controls most questions of priority of the proceeds because the general rule for priority is the first to file or
perfect. §9-312(5).
78 U.C.C. §9-312(3) (1990).
7 The steps the purchase money secured party with an interest in inventory must take in order to
get priority include: 1) perfecting before the debtor gets possession of the collateral; 2) giving written notice
to all other secured parties who had filed as to the same collateral before the purchase money party filed;
3) stating in the notice that the purchase money party was going to take a security interest in specifically
described (by item or type) inventory; and 4) making sure that the previously filed secured parties receive
the notice sometime within five years before the debtor receives possession of the inventory. The last
requirement necessitates an explanation. This allows the purchase money party ,who is going to make
several sales to the debtor, to give notice to a particular creditor only once every five years. But the notice
before the first sale must be received by the competing secured party before the debtor receives possession
of the inventory.
8 U.C.C. §9-312(3) (1990).
91 U.C.C. §9-312(4) (1990).
82 U.C.C. §9-306(1) (1990).
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after acquired inventory. Creditor #2 has a purchase money security interest
in a boat sold to the debtor dealer. Creditor #2 filed after Creditor #1 but
because creditor #2 is a purchase money party they have priority over #1 as
to the particular boat. If that boat is sold to a buyer in the ordinary course of
the debtor's business, creditors #1 and 2 are going to fight over the proceeds.
If the proceeds are cash and a trade-in vehicle, #1 wins as to the trade-in since
it is not cash proceeds, and #2 will win as to the cash assuming the debtor
received the cash on or before the buyer received possession of the car.
Now assume that creditor #3 comes into the picture and files even earlier
than did #1 but takes a security interest in the debtor's accounts receivable
now and after-acquired. Now, when the buyer purchases the car, the buyer
pays with a trade-in and an unsecured promise to pay the remaining balance
over the next year, i.e., an account receivable. Creditor #1 wins as to the
trade-in and #2 is second. Creditor #3 has no interest since his only interest
is in accounts. But who wins as to the accounts? Since the account is not
cash proceeds, creditor #3 wins as to the account because he was the first
creditor to file or perfect. Number 1 comes next as the next creditor to file
and the purchase money party comes in last. If Creditor #3 had been the last
to file then #1 would have won as to the account because he was the first to
file. Observe the extent to which the general first to file or perfect rule
controlled most of the above described priority fights.
Specific rules are also contained in sections 9-308 and 9-309 which cover
chattel paper, instruments and documents. Taking section 9-308 first, it
changes the general rules discussed above if the proceeds paid by the buyer
of the boat is in the form of chattel paper instead of an account. Assume as
above that #1 filed first but #2 as a purchase money party has first priority as
to the particular boat. Now #3 takes a security interest in the debtor's now
owned and after-acquired chattel paper and was the last to file. Assume that
when the buyer bought the boat, they signed a note evidencing their promise
to pay over the next year and a security agreement to secure that promise.
This is chattel paper. a3
Who wins as to the chattel paper proceed? Creditor #3 probably wins
even though he was the last to file. But he will win only if he gave new value
and took possession of the paper in the ordinary course of his business. 4 It
does not matter whether he knew about Creditors #1 and #2's interest before
he took his interest in the chattel paper since the proceeds are proceeds of
U.C.C. §9-308.(1990).
84 U.C.C. §9-308(b) (1990).
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inventory and controlled by section 9-308(b). The only way for the inventory
financier to have priority over the chattel paper financier is for the inventory
financier to take a direct interest in the chattel paper and file or perfect first;
or take possession of the chattel paper so that no other party can meet the
standards of section 9-308.85
The Code even has rules covering the fight between the inventory
financier and the accounts or chattel paper financier when the buyer returns
the boat to the dealer or the dealer repossesses the boat from a defaulting
buyer. 86 Subsection 9-306(5) applies to the returned boat the priorities set out
among the parties when the proceeds were the account or chattel paper. The
account or chattel paper is worthless, so the creditors are now interested in
their claim to the returned boat. If the proceeds before return were chattel
paper, then, the chattel paper financier beats the inventory financier if the
chattel paper financier had priority under section 9-308. The accounts
receivable financier does not fare as well. Recall that unlike the chattel paper
financier, the accounts financier beats the inventory financier, whose interest
in the account is only a proceeds interest, only if the accounts financier was
the first to file or perfect. This is the rule for the returned or repossessed boat.
The accounts financier wins only if they were the first to file and had priority
in the account.
Negotiable instruments and negotiable documents are covered by the
specific rule in section 9-309. In this section, Article Nine conforms with the
HDC rules in Article Three and the holder to whom negotiable documents of
title are duly negotiated rules in Article Seven. This section also covers
purchasers of securities in conjunction with Article Eight but these rules will
be ignored here since securities are not normally proceeds. The only issue
that Article Nine adds by way of section 9-309 to the rules set forth in the
other Articles is the fact that the previous party's filed financing statement
does not constitute notice to defeat the rights of the subsequent holder.
The rules for a holder to whom a negotiable document has been duly
negotiated are very similar to the HDC rules.87 The holder of the document
must be a "holder" which is accomplished by endorsement and delivery of
5 Note that the inventory financier that takes this route to protect itself, in the case the after
acquired property clause fails to protect it, will want to mark the chattel paper with a statement of the
financier's interest. This is because another buyer or lender who does not know of the financier's interest,
and who gives new value and takes possession of the chattel paper, will beat the financier's interest in the
chattel paper under section 9-308(a).
U.C.C. §9-306(5) (1990).
U.C.C. §7-501 (1990).
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order documents and delivery alone of bearer documents. 88 For "due
negotiation" the holder must take the document in the ordinary course, in good
faith and without notice of any defenses or claims just like a holder in due
course of a negotiable instrument.8" If a negotiable instrument,( i.e., a note,
a check, or a negotiable document of title, such as a negotiable warehouse
receipt), is given to the debtor as payment for some piece of collateral then the
collateral financier will likely lose to a subsequent holder.
Article Nine has a limited group of property categories.' The priority
rules concerning the proceeds of inventory are exhaustive and cover each type
of collateral. However, this does not mean that Article Nine leaves nothing
for the courts to fill in. Grant Gilmour stated in his book, whivh was publish-
ed in 1965, that the draftsmen had to leave some fights out of Article Nine.
Specifically, he mentions the relation between financing banks and sureties.91
Yet, especially after the 1972 amendments, Article Nine covers most issues.
In considering the above discussed priority rules, keep in mind that in
every one of the ordinary course of business cases that allowed the bank to
keep the money, the bank had either a junior security interest in the inventory
that generated the proceeds or no security interest at all.' Article Nine
U Id. at §7-501(1), (2) (1990).
89 Id. at §7-501(4). Holders to whom negotiable documents have been duly negotiated do not
always beat previously perfected parties. Section 7-503 protects a prior secured party with an interest in
the goods or represented by the negotiable document, but only if the debtor had no actual or apparent
authority to sell, ship or store the goods and the secured party did not acquiesce in the procurement by the
debtor of the document. This is not easily shown, however. Section 7-503 comment I states:
"acquiescence'... does not require active consent under subsection (1)(b) and knowledge of the likelihood
of storage or shipment with no objection or effort to control it is sufficient to defeat his rights as against one
who takes by 'due' negotiation of a negotiable document.".
90 The types of goods covered in section 9-109 are inventory, farm products, consumer goods, and
equipment. Then there are the tangible intangibles which include instruments, documents and chattel
paper. Last are the intangible intangibles which include accounts receivables and general intangibles. Both
the for tangible and intangible property the Code provides a catch-all section. Equipment is the catch-all
section for tangible property and general intangibles fills that function for intangible property.
91 GILMORE, supra note 1, at 656.
92 Orix Credit Alliance Inc. v. Sovran Bank, 4 F.3d 1262, 1274 (Sovran Bank was arguably junior
because of the subordination agreement not because of the priority rules in Article Nine. But as a purchase
money secured party, Orix could have obtained Article Nine priority.); Harley-Davidson Motor Co., Inc.
v. Bank of New England-Old Colony,, 897 F.2d 611,613 (1st Cir. 1990); General Elec. Co. Lighting Bus.
Group v. Halmar Distrib., 116 B.R. 328, 330 ( Bankr. D. Mass. 1990). (holding the bank had a junior
security interest in the specific inventory). J.L Case Credit Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Madison County,
991 F.2d 1272, 1273 (7th Cir. 1993); Tuloka Affiliates, Inc. v. Security State Bank, 627 P.2d 816, 817
(Kan. 1981). (holding the bank's security interest was in other inventory not in the inventory that created
the proceeds.)
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relegates this fight to the general rule of first to file or perfect. By using the
ordinary course of business rule, the courts allowed a creditor that Article
Nine places in a junior position to nonetheless win. In Orix, the court went
as far to ignore a subordination agreement between the bank and the secured
creditor.
The secured parties who are given priority over previously filed or
perfected parties are few and far between. Chattel paper financiers are such
a group, but only if they have given new value and take possession of the
paper. These steps entail considerable policing of the debtor. As to the
proceeds of property other than inventory, the chattel paper financier wins
only if in addition tb the requirements of new value and possession it takes
without notice of the prior secured party's interest.
Holders in due course and holders to whom negotiable documents of title
have been duly negotiated also take priority over a previously filed secured
party. However, to be a HDC or a holder of a duly negotiated document, the
creditor must take without notice of the claim of the secured party.
There is only one other category of creditor which which defeats a
previously filed and perfected party, which has not yet been discussed. This
category consists of buyers. Buyers are an especially interesting group since
the "ordinary course of business" cases analogize not only to buyers in
general, but to the most protected buyer in the entire Code: the buyer in the
ordinary course of business. This analogy is especially clear in the Seventh
Circuit case, J.L Case Credit Corp.. In this case, it was pursuant to the buyer
in the "ordinary course of business" rules, that the court drew its test for
knowledge.93 The buyer in the ordinary course must take without knowledge
that the transfer is in violation of the secured party's interest. It matters not
that the buyer knows that a secured party has a security interest in the item
being purchased.
It is not easy to qualify as a buyer in the "ordinary course of business."
First, these special buyers must be buying from someone in the business of
selling the item bought."' Second, the buyer in the ordinary course must also
give new value. Most importantly, payment in partial or total satisfaction of
93 J.L Case Credit Corp., 991 F.2d at 1278-80.
% U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1990). These other requirements include: good faith, and an ordinary course
purchase. Excluded in addition to payments on antecedent debts, are pawnbrokers transactions and sales
in bulk.
BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
a preexisting indebtedness precludes a person from being a buyer in the
ordinary course.9
Clearly banks in the ordinary course cases cannot fit within the definition
of buyer in the ordinary course. First, they are not buyers; buyers must be
exchanging cash or other property for the property purchased.96 Throughout
common law jurisprudence, buyers have received greater protection than
creditors. Second, a bank does not give new value. In taking the money they
are paying off pre-existing loans. Thus, for two very important reasons banks
cannot qualify as buyers in the ordinary course. Why the Seventh Circuit is
analogizing to these rules is perplexing.
Nor do all buyers, in fact, win under Article Nine. In addition to buyers
in the ordinary course of business there are consumer buyers, namely buyers
who are buying from another consumer.97 These buyers beat a previously
perfected secured party, but only if the buyer does not have knowledge of the
secured party's claim to the property. More importantly, even consumer
buyers do not win if the secured party has perfected by filing a financing
statement before the sale. Incidentally, most of the banks in the ordinary
course cases had knowledge of the secured party's claim.
The catch all category of buyers, i.e., buyers who do not fit in the other
two categories, allows the buyer priority only if the secured party is unper-
fected.9' The banks would have all won in the ordinary course cases if the
secured party had not perfected its interest in the inventory. Every competing
creditor and buyer beats the unperfected Article Nine secured party.99 All the
secured parties in the ordinary course cases had filed and were perfected.
U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1990).
Id.
U.C.C. §9-307(2) (1990).
99 U.C.C. §9-301 (l)(c) (1990). A colleague and I have debated for years whether the section 9-301
buyer of goods takes free of the secured party's unperfected interest or only takes priority. This is probably
more of an academic question, but one can imagine a purchase of something for a price below its fair
market value. Who is entitled to the value above the price paid by the buyer? If the buyer took free of the
security interest, then the buyer gets to keep the value. If, however, the buyer only takes with priority then
the secured party who is junior could force the sale of the property and capture the value above and beyond
the purchase price. Section 9-307 says that the buyer takes free of the security interest. However, section
9-301 says that the unperfected secured party is subordinate to the parties listed in that section, which
include buyers who do not get the protection of section 9-307 like buyers in bulk. An even more interesting
question is who gets property value increase after the sale ,not caused by the buyer's efforts, if the buyer
only gets priority.
Id.
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Consequently, the only type of buyer who could have beaten the secured
parties in the ordinary course cases is the ordinary course of business buyer.
Nor can the banks analogize their position to that of the chattel paper fin-
ancier. To achieve priority, the financier must give new value just as did the
buyer in the ordinary course. The only two groups of people who beat pre-
viously filed and perfected secured parties must give new value in order to win
and must satisfy other requirements. None of the banks who won in the
ordinary course cases gave new value in exchange for the payment."° The
bottom line is that in Article Nine, no one beats a previously filed and per-
fected secured party if that person has knowledge of the secured party's
interest in the property except: 1) a buyer in the ordinary course; and 2) chattel
paper financiers when they are fighting with an inventory financier's proceeds
interest.10'
Both these types of people have special reasons why they are given this
exalted position. Our economy would cease to function efficiently if every
time a person made a purchase they had to check the U.C.C. filing records to
ensure that no one held a valid security interest. Most buyers would not have
the vaguest idea where to look. If they did look, and found out that they did
not take free, they would not buy the item. Buyers in the ordinary course even
take free of a previously filed federal tax lien and very few parties beat the
I.R.S..J°2
Chattel-paper financiers are given an exalted position because the Article
Nine draftsmen decided that the debtor should be able to use chattel paper
proceeds of inventory for additional financing. 3 Originally the priority of the
chattel paper buyer who beats the inventory financier was placed in section 9-
306. The Comment to section 9-306 in the first Official Code of 1952 noted
that this rule was needed to keep inventory financiers from monopolizing all
forms of property of the debtor.1"' Moreover, this was the law before the
100 In the Eighth Circuit case, Barber-Greene Co. v. Nat'l City Bank of Minneapolis 816 F.2d 1267
1272, (8th Cir. 1987), the creditor argued that after the proceeds money was deposited in the collateral
account and used to pay off the bank's loans, the bank reloaned the money to the debtor and the debtor drew
on this line of credit and spent the money. This did not change the Eighth Circuit's decision that the
payment of proceeds into the collateral account was not in the ordinary course and therefore the bank had
to pay the money to the secured party.
101 If the proceeds are from collateral other than inventory, then knowledge of the prior security
interest will preclude the chattel paper financier from taking priority in the chattel paper. U.C.C. §9-308(a)
(1990).
102 I.R.C. §6323(b)(3) (1988).
103 U.C.C. §9-306 cmt.2(c) (1952).
104 U.C.C. §9-306(4), cmt. 2(c) (1952).
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Code was enacted. 5 If the inventory financier were able to have priority as
to the chattel paper, then fewer debtors would be able to use this valuable
property as collateral for a loan. The inventory financier can still beat the
chattel paper financier but it must take special action to do so."
Why should a bank that has a junior security interest in the debtor's
inventory, or no consensual interest at all, be given priority over the senior
security interest simply because a wire transfer of the proceeds was sent to the
bank, or a check was sent by the account debtor to a lock box that the bank
endorsed over to itself in order to pay off the debtor's loans at the bank? Why
should a check drawn by the debtor on its bank account and sent to the bank
be sufficient to elevate the junior creditor over the senior creditor? If the
bank, in taking the check, is a HDC then Article Nine recognizes the long
established rule that allows the HDC to take free of claims and defenses. But
to be an HDC the bank must be without notice of the secured party's claim.
The First Circuit, in Harley-Davidson, provided a rationale in support of
giving the bank priority despite knowledge of the claim of the senior Article
Nine claimant. The court reasoned that the ordinary course test must be broad
or else ordinary suppliers like the sellers of gas, electricity, tables or chairs
would be forced to return the money to the inventory financier. 10 7
Is the bank in Harley-Davidson like a supplier of electricity? Recall the
bank in that case had a junior interest in the used motorcycles that were part
of the debtor's inventory. Because the bank obtained the title documents for
the cycles, the bank could require payment each time a cycle was sold. As a
junior inventory financier, the bank knew about the senior secured party's
interest in the same cycles. Suppose the electricity supplier for some reason
knows that the money that has been sent to it belongs to the inventory
financier. Should the electricity supplier be able to keep the money? It is
submitted that neither the bank nor such an electricity supplier should be able
to keep the money. What most suppliers of gas, electricity, tables and chairs
have in common is the lack of information about the debtor's finances. Take
for an example employees of the debtor. The secured party could not claim
checks paid out to the workers even if the checks were purely proceeds. But
would the same rule apply to the company comptroller who knows that his
paycheck constitutes the secured party's proceeds?
10 GILMORE, supra note 1, at 728.
106 See supra text accompanying note 83.
107 Harley-Davidson Motor Co., Inc. v. Bank of New England-Old Colony, 897 F.2d 611, 622 (1 st
Cir. 1990).
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It is submitted here that it should not. What then does Comment 2(c) to
section 9-306 add to the other rules in Article Nine? It fills the gap among the
rules regarding the transfer of non-negotiable items. But the rule should not
be any broader than the HDC rules. At least, the rule should not allow
someone to knowingly take someone else's money no matter who they are.
There is no policy that raises them to the level of the buyer in ordinary course
or chattel paper financier.
The history to Comment 2(c) in section 9-306 suggests that the drafters of
Article Nine did not intend the comment to elevate a junior inventory secured
party over the senior. The 1950 "Proposed Final Draft" was the first official
American Law Institute document to have Article Nine with comments. 08
Comment 2(c) in section 9-306 discusses the fact that a note purchased by a
HDC would defeat the secured lender's interest.0 9 This comment also refers
to section 9-307 the buyers in ordinary course section and section 9-308 the
chattel paper section, as well as as other sections defining when someone
could defeat a proceeds interest. The current language in Comment 2(c)
dealing with transfers in the ordinary course first appeared in 1952 in the first
Official Code."' This comment starts out by discussing sections 9-307, 9-308
and 9-309 as examples of people who take priority as to proceeds and 9-
306(4) which covered chattel paper that was proceeds of inventory (this sec-
tion was later moved into 9-308(b) where it has remained in the current Code).
In the next paragraph, the comment is concerned with secured parties who
might lose because they allow the debtor to keep possession of the proceeds.
It first discusses the types of proceeds that are covered in sections 9-307, 9-
308, and 9-309. Comment 3 then talks about cash proceeds deposited in a
bank account and paid out in the ordinary course of the debtor's business.
When proceeds are deposited in a bank account and paid out, a check that is
drawn on the account is still a check. Comment 2(c) may be a mere
illustration of how the HDC rules would operate to protect the taker of the
check in order to provide a warning to inventory financiers who leave
proceeds with debtors.
The 1958 Official Code moved the Comment's discussion of section 9-
307, 9-308 and 9-309 to Comment 3 where the discussion no longer refers to
proceeds."' Now these sections are discussed in reference to a transfer of the
109 U.C.C. Article Nine (Proposed Final Draft 1950).
109 U.C.C. §9-306 cnt. 2(c) (Proposed Final Draft 1950).
1" U.C.C. §9-306 cmt. 2(c) (1952).
II U.C.C. §9-306 cmt. 3 (1958).
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collateral itself. Left in subsection 2(c), alone, is the language about the
transfers in the ordinary course.' 2 This structure remains today." 3 Given its
history, the most logical interpretation of 2(c) is just as an illustration of how
the proceeds could disappear if left in the debtor's hands. If this is the Code's
interpretation then it means no more than the HDC rules and cannot be
expanded to justify any of the ordinary course cases.
More persuasive than the history of the U.C.C. is PEB's Commentary
No.7 issued March 10, 1990. Three of the ordinary course cases cited herein
were decided after Commentary No.7 had been issued but none of these courts
mention the Commentary." 4
The PEB Commentaries were and are issued pursuant to a resolution
passed by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws." 5 They were and are created by the
Permanent Editorial Board of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. All but one of these Commentaries make changes to the
Code's comments."6 Members of the Permanent Editorial Board are listed in
each group of PEB Commentaries.
Commentary No. 7 discusses cash and check proceeds sent by an account
debtor directly to a creditor who has a junior interest in the chattel paper,
accounts or general intangibles. To this extent the problem addressed in the
Commentary is it very similar to the ordinary course cases. The only
difference is that the commentary is talking about proceeds from chattel paper,
122 U.C.C. §9-306 cmt.2(c) (1958).
113 U.C.C. §9-306 cmt.2(c) (1990).
114 Orix Credit Alliance Inc. v. Sovran Bank, 4 F.3d 1262 (4th Cir. 1993); J.I. Case Credit Corp.
v. First Nat'l Bank of Madison County, 991 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir. 1993); General Elec. Co. Lighting Bus.
Group v. Halmar Distrib. (In Re Halmar Distrib.), 116 B.R. 328 (Bankr. D.Mass. 1990).
115 The full resolution states:
[a] PEB Commentary should come within one or more of the following specific purposes,
which should be made apparent at the inception of the Commentary: (1) to resolve an
ambiguity in the UCC by restating more clearly what the PEB considers to be the legal rule;
(2) to state a preferred resolution of an issue on which judicial opinion or scholarly writing
diverges; (3) to elaborate on the application of the UCC where the statute and/or the Official
Comment leaves doubt as to inclusion or exclusion of, or application to, particular
circumstances or transactions; (4) consistent with UCC section 1-201(2)(b), to apply the
principles of the UCC to new or changed circumstances; (5) to clarify or elaborate upon the
operation of the UCC as it relates to other statutes (such as the Bankruptcy Code and various
federal and state consumer protection statutes) and general principles of law and equity
pursuant to UCC section 1-103; or (6) to otherwise improve the operation of the UCC.
116 All the PEB Commemtaries with the exception of Commentary No. 13 make changes or
additions to the current Code comments. Commentary 13 does however add a paragraph to the Prefatory
Note to Article 4A.
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accounts, and general intangibles not inventory. The Commentary is
concerned with the question of whether the senior secured party can get the
money back from the junior creditor. The Commentary states that the result
depends on whether the payment is made by way of a check or cash. If the
account debtor sends a check, then the holder in due course rules apply.1
1 7
The bank was a recipient of a check in J.LCase Credit Corp. and General
Electric Co. Lighting Business Group. Neither court adopts the HDC test.
The commentary notes that even if the bank is not an HDC, the bank
might win under section 9-308 which also covers the transfer of instruments
in addition to the transfer of chattel paper. None of the above cases would
qualify for section 9-308 priority because in order to qualify for section 9-308
relief, the bank must have given new value for the check. If the check
represents inventory proceeds then the bank can win even if it has notice of
the senior party's interest, but new value and possession of the check are keys
for success under 9-308.
For a cash payment from the account debtor, the Commentary adopts the
common law rule of restitution. It notes that the Code, unlike the treatment
of payment with a check, does not specifically address the right of the junior
secured party to keep cash. It concludes that the rules must be interpreted
according to the common law, which incoproated into the Code through
section 1-103."' It starts with the general rule that the senior secured party
can get restitution of the amount. It then lists the circumstances under which
the junior party can keep the cash. These requirements include taking the cash
for value, not new value, in good faith, and without knowledge or reason to
know of the senior party's interest in the chattel paper, instruments, or general
intangibles which are generating the cash proceeds payment. Note that the
knowledge requirement is the same as the Code's definition of notice. Also,
note that it is not notice that the cash is proceeds but notice of the senior's
interest in the original collateral that generated the proceeds. The junior
secured party must take the cash without notice of the senior party's interest
just as does the HDC.
In the cases covered by Commentary 7, the junior secured party may not
know of the senior's interest since these contests arise when the debtor assigns
117 U.C.C. PEB Commentary No. 7 (1990)
Is U.C.C. §1-103 (1990) This section brings common law rules into the Code when the Code does
not specifically address the problem. Listed as examples are "the law merchant and the law relative to
capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating
or invalidating cause ..."
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an interest in the same collateral to two different parties. In all of the ordinary
course cases, however, the bank had reason to know of the senior party's
claim to the original collateral.
The Commentary cites in support of its discussion of the common law
rules: Restatement of Restitution section 126 comment f and illustration 8 and
the Restatement 2d of Contracts section 342(b) comment e and illustration 3.
Comment f of the Restatement of Restitution states that a bona fide purchaser
has no duty of restitution. Illustration 8 is an example of a bona fide
purchaser. The key in that illustration is that the second assignee had no
reason to know about the first assignment. Section 342(b) of the Restatement
Second of Contracts also uses the knowledge or reason to know standard.
Comment f of the Restatement of Restitution makes reference to the bona
fide purchaser rules in sections 172 through 176. Restatement of Restitution
section 172 defines when there has been a bona fide purchase. It requires that
the claimant give value and take without notice. Interestingly, notice is
defined by the Restatement of Restitution section 174 as when the claimant
knows the facts or should have known the facts. Of course should have
known requires an inquiry for more information once a reasonable claimant
would have acquired enough information to make the matter questionable." 9
This definition in section 174 excludes holders in due course. No doubt this
is because the holder in due course rules referred to in the Restatement of
Restitution are that the taker take in good faith and without knowledge. 2
PEB Commentary No. 7 uses instead, reason to know, and this is the same
standard that is required of an HDC under the U.C.C.
The Commentary makes it clear that the constructive notice provided by
a filed financing statement does not satisfy reason to know. This is also part
of section 9-309 which covers negotiable instruments and documents. In all
of the ordinary course cases the bank knew of the secured party's interest and
knew that the secured party had the senior position with respect to all or a part
of the inventory. In Orix and Harley-Davidson the bank knew that the money
in the wire transfer and check were the senior creditor's proceeds. No case
involved constructive notice and constructive notice would never satisfy the
reason to know test.
19 Restatement of Restitution §174 cmt.a. (1937).
2' Restatement of Restitution § 174 cmt c. (1937) The Restatement of Restitution was promulgated
in 1937 when the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law was in place in many jurisdictions. The holder in
due course rules of today require not only good faith and no knowledge but also no reason to know.
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The Commentary also makes reference to Comment 2(c) in section 9-306
under the "cf' signal. The "cf signal means that the cited authority
constitutes a proposition different from the main proposition but sufficiently
analogous to lend support.'
To which type of interest are the banks in the ordinary course cases most
closely analogous? Are they more like the junior secured party discussed in
Commentary No.7 or they more like a buyer in the ordinary course of
business? The bank's position has no similarity with the buyer in the ordinary
course other than the transfer in the ordinary course. They have many
similarities to the junior secured creditors in Commentary No.7. The courts
have turned for analogy to the buyer in the ordinary course rule. This was the
wrong choice. After all, the banks are junior secured parties to the debtor's
inventory or not secured at all. In Orix and General Electric Co Lighting the
bank received the money not from the debtor, but from the third party who
was obligated to pay just like the third party in the Commentary. Arguably the
wire transfer in Orix is like cash, and in General Electric Co. Lighting the
account debtor sent a check. It is submitted here that the Commentary No.7
rules should apply in all of these cases. If payment is by check then the bank
must meet the HDC standard to win. If cash is used, then the banks must take
the cash in good faith and without notice of the senior creditor's security
interest in the collateral that generated the proceed.
If these are the rules applied, not the rule in Comment 2(c), the result will
be more analogous to the set-off rules at common law. Recall that under even
"the legal rule", the bank cannot win if it has knowledge or reason to know of
the other party's interest. Moreover, in most of the ordinary course cases, the
senior creditor has the equities. In Orix, the court made note of the fact that
Orix did nothing to protect its interest once it consented to the sale of the
crane. Orix did, however, obtain the agreement of the debtor to pay off the
loan with part of the money."n The court should have focused on the fact that
the bank had agreed to subordinate its interest to Orix's interest. Orix may
well have been relying on that subordination agreement in not taking action
to insure that the third party buyer sent the money directly to Orix. It is
possible that, but for the subordination promise, Orix would never have lent
the money to the debtor to buy the crane in the first place. Orix was a
purchase money party. No other creditor receives the protection accorded to
121 EDrroRs OF THE COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION Er AL., THE BLUEBOOK A UNIFORM
SYSTEM OF C1ATION Rule 1.2 (15th Ed. 1991).
122 Orix Credit Alliance, Inc. v. Sovran Bank, 4 F.3d 1262, 1264 (4th Cir. 1993).
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a purchase money party.123 As Grant Gilmore said: "[t]he closest thing to
invulnerability is a purchase-money loan on the security of goods over which
the debtor has no power [of] disposition...". This was the position of Orix.
Without their loan, the debtor would never have had the crane and the bank
would never have had the proceeds from the sale of the crane. All of the
equities in that case were on the side of Orix not the bank.
CONCLUSION
The "ordinary course of business" rule, as the First Fourth, and Seventh
Circuits have applied it, allows a party to avoid Article Nine's carefully laid-
out rules. There is no policy to justify such a deviation, and in fact, policy
supports an application of the rules in Article Nine. None of the Courts
provides any reasoning which stands up to scrutiny to justify their application
of the ordinary course of business test. If the courts had applied the correct
analysis such absurd results, as the one in Orix, would not have occurred.
Applying the reason to know test makes the rules more consistent no matter
whether the bank is setting off, acting as a HDC or taking money out of a
blocked account. The different actions of the bank should not justify a
complete ignoring of the bank's knowledge. This application of the ordinary
course rules should not be followed.
12 GIIMo., supra note 1, at 653.
